More honey than vinegar: peer review as a middle ground between universalism and national sovereignty by Dominguez-Redondo, Elvira & Mcmahon, Edward
61
More Honey Than Vinegar:  
Peer Review As a Middle Ground between 
Universalism and National Sovereignty
elvira domínguez-redondo and  
edward r. mcmahon
Introduction
Dr. Martin Luther King famously suggested that the arc of the moral universe is long and that it bends towards justice.1 This 
vision is reflected in growing and evolving global acceptance of the 
universality of human rights values. The positive correlation between 
justice, especially as evidenced by respect for human rights, and the 
prevention of conflict has been well articulated.2 It has been argued 
that a generalized understanding is now developing regarding the 
conceptualization and implementation of human rights that diver-
ges from the first, second, and third world doctrines, which domin-
ated the global human rights agenda until the end of the Cold War.3 
Although elements of the philosophies underpinning Western, 
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 1 On the origin of the expression and its use by Martin Luther King, see Joshua 
Cohen, The Arc of the Moral Universe and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010) at 17, n 4. A modern and interesting reformulation of the 
idea can be found in David Keane, “Survival of the Fairest: Evolution and 
Geneticization of Human Rights” (2010) 30:3 Oxford J Legal Stud 467.
 2 See, for example, UN General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/59/2005 
(21 March 2005).
 3 Elvira Domínguez-Redondo, “Role of the UN in the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights” in Azizur Rahman Chowdhury and Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, 
eds, An Introduction to International Human Rights Law (Boston: Brill, 2010) 119 at 
121-25.
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socialist, and developing countries’ doctrines on human rights 
continue to permeate inter-governmental human rights debates, 
albeit with many nuances no longer captured in traditional East-
West or North-South divides, the current period is marked by a 
“broad consensus on the need to consider respect for human rights 
a sine qua non for full international legitimization.”4 An interesting 
proposition is that the existence of a “global consensus” in inter-
national law is the result of the overlapping views of a few powerful 
countries.5 Still, the voices contesting the universality of global values 
as foundations of international law, and particularly as foundations 
of the international human rights regime, are far from silenced.
This article explores the potential of strategies, rather than phil-
osophies, for the implementation of human rights as a means of 
reconciling the universalist and relativist conceptual approaches. 
In doing so, it engages with the eternal issue of “sovereignty” as an 
impediment to strengthening the international human rights re-
gime. The founders of the United Nations were unable to over-
come their concerns regarding limitations to their sovereignty, 
including transferring various governance competencies to inter-
national organizations. As a result, Article 2(7) of the Charter of the 
United Nations (UN Charter) maintains the principle of state sover-
eignty, constraining the organization’s powers to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of member states, with the sole exception of col-
lective action under Chapter VII in response to the breach of, or 
threats to, international peace and security.6 Despite this strong 
assertion, articulated among the principles of the organization, 
references to human rights included elsewhere in the UN Charter 
have been used as a foundation for an increasingly active UN hu-
man rights regime, permeating (at least nominally) all of the spheres 
of activity and structures of the United Nations.7
 4 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 
354.
 5 Using the examples of the United States, the European Union, and China, see 
Anu Bradford and Eric A Posner, “Universal Exceptionalism in International 
Law” (2011) 52:1 Harv Int’l LJ 3.
 6 Charter of the United Nations, Can TS 1945 No 7 (in force 24 October 1945) [UN 
Charter].
 7 On the 1997 UN reforms, aimed at mainstreaming human rights, see Elvira 
Domínguez-Redondo, “The Millennium Development Goals and the Human 
Rights Based Approach: Reflecting on Structural Chasms with the United Nations 
System” (2009) 13:1 Int’l JHR 29 at 31. In her 2011 annual report, the UN high 
commissioner for human rights highlighted the approval of the following policy 
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The evolution of the UN human rights regime has been signifi-
cantly influenced by the changing cast of dominant state actors. 
The more developed Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries have generally been more open 
to accepting and promoting some evolving international norms, 
even though these may result in diminished sovereignty. They have 
been frequently prepared to specifically criticize and “call out” states 
deemed to be violating commonly accepted human rights principles. 
By contrast, the Non-Aligned Movement, then the G-77, and, more 
recently, the emerging powers known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) have had a different approach.8 The 
change in the relative participation and influence of emerging 
powers, many of which did not participate actively in the develop-
ment of earlier conceptions of the international human rights 
machinery, has led to a significant debate. As the human rights 
machinery has grown, these states have aligned themselves, at least 
in theory, with a conception of human rights that is more consonant 
with the notion of state sovereignty, in which cultural differences 
often significantly contribute to the formulation of normative stan-
dards (for example, the discussion on the defamation of religions).9 
  documents as key components of the efforts to mainstream human rights: (1) 
Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (approved by the UN Secretary General in 
2011); (2) the Joint Policies on Human Rights for Peace Missions (endorsed in 
September 2011 by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Depart-
ment of Political Affairs, and the Department of Field Support); and (3) the 
Human Rights Mainstreaming Mechanism under the United Nations Development Group, 
United Nations Development Group, “UNDG Human Rights Mainstreaming 
Mechanism Operational Plan 2011-2013” (2011), online: <http://undg.org/
docs/12173/UNDG-HRM%20OperationalPlan%20Nov%202011.pdf>. See 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR Report 2011 (2012) 
at 190. See also Domínguez-Redondo at 11-12, 42-43, 59-60, 70-72, 79-81, 92-94.
 8 One example of this is demonstrated in Edward R McMahon, The First Cycle of 
the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council: 
A Work in Progress (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012) at 24-26, online: <http://
www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/documents/08_2012_UPR%20McMahon.
pdf>. See also Miko Lempinen, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
and the Different Treatment of Governments (Turku: Åbo Akademi University, 2005) 
at 167-92.
 9 Between 1999 and 2011, the Commission on Human Rights and the Human 
Rights Council (HRC) adopted resolutions, sponsored by the Organisation of 
Islamic Countries, on “defamation of religions,” which implied some endorse-
ment of controversial limitations to the right of freedom of expression. 
HRC Resolution 16/18 (2011) has changed this trend, replacing the focus on 
“combating defamation” with “combating religious intolerance.” See HRC,
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The biggest impact, however, lies in their insistence that apolitical 
technical co-operation, rather than value-laden “naming and sham-
ing,” is the appropriate approach by which to advance human rights. 
As a result, these states continue to resist measures deemed to 
monitor their compliance with human rights obligations without 
their express consent and, therefore, remain proponents of a re-
strictive conception of sovereignty.10 At the same time, however, a 
range of methodological approaches, such as the responsibility- 
to-protect concept (R2P) and peer-review mechanisms, both de-
veloped with the explicit support of G-77 states, reflect moves in this 
era of globalization towards more flexible interpretations of national 
sovereignty.
Two of the major initiatives focusing on governance and human 
rights are the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Both ap-
proaches are relatively new. The APRM was implemented in 2003 
and the UPR in 2008. They represent, at least in theory, a fresh 
approach as they do not involve conditionality and have the potential 
to minimize North-South and other cleavages between regions.11
This article begins by explaining the context in which peer review 
mechanisms were conceived as a means of addressing the long-
standing denunciation of the political selectivity of investigation 
and/or condemnation of situations in particular territories.12 It 
  Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, 
Incitement to Violence and Violence against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief, HRC 
Res 16/18 (2011), UNGAOR, 16th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/16/18 (2011). 
However, proposals to introduce a ban on defamation of religion are still an 
incendiary topic in human rights fora. See, for example, Daniel Osabu-Kle, 
Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa (Peterborough, 
ON: Broadview Press, 2000). See also Brett G Scharffs, “International Law and 
the Defamation of Religion Conundrum” (2013) 11:1 Rev Faith & International 
Affairs 66.
 10 See Elvira Domínguez-Redondo, “The Universal Periodic Review: Is There Life 
beyond Naming and Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?” (2012) 4 NZL 
Rev 673.
 11 “Conditionality” refers to a specific set of conditions attached to the disburse-
ment of policy-based lending or budget support. See Stefan Koeberle et al, eds, 
Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2005) at 6.
 12 On the motivations and political background surrounding the creation of the 
UPR, see Elvira Domínguez-Redondo, “The Universal Periodic Review of the 
UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the First Session” (2010) 7:3 
Chinese J Int’l L 721 at 722-24.
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explores the gap between the universalist and cultural relativist 
human rights perspectives and highlights the role of human rights 
in what is claimed to be a progressive erosion of the sovereignty of 
states. This exploration sets the scene to consider the nascent role 
of one international organization’s peer review process — the UPR 
— at the UN Human Rights Council in contrast to other, more 
traditional (and coercive) methods of influencing state behaviour 
regarding human rights. Through the prism of the UPR, this article 
will challenge common perceptions regarding regional blocs and 
the pursuit of national and regional policies on human rights issues 
and explain the potential of such a mechanism to showcase existing 
or emerging customary law. Furthermore, it will explore the role 
and potential of inter-governmental mechanisms based on peer 
review assessment in the prevention of human rights violations and 
conflict mitigation. In examining the last point, it will focus on the 
outcomes of the UPR but will also refer to the APRM.
Overall, this article aims to demonstrate that peer review mechan-
isms may, if used wisely, “thread the needle” by addressing national 
sovereignty concerns while concomitantly promoting adherence to 
universal human rights standards. It also posits the idea that the 
establishment of peer review mechanisms with which states are 
voluntarily engaging for the promotion and protection of human 
rights may be a reflection of a level of “maturity” of human rights 
law as a subject of international law.
Universal Periodic Review: A Contemporary  
Inter-Governmental Approach to Implementing  
Human Rights
While no general norm of international law obliges states to choose 
any particular means of monitoring their compliance with agreed 
standards or in resolving disputes, the vast majority of international 
disputes involving states and/or international organizations follow 
a pattern. Diplomatic means of dispute settlement are attempted 
first and other, more adversarial, means are used when diplomatic 
means do not bear fruit.13 In extreme cases where there is a threat 
to peace and security, the UN Security Council may decide a course 
of action that also follows the logic of gradually increasing severity 
of measures, from less to more aggressive, as exemplified in Articles 
41 and 42 of the UN Charter.
 13 On means used to resolve international disputes, see Ian Brownlie, “The Peaceful 
Settlement of International Disputes” (2009) 8:2 Chinese J Int’l L 267.
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Contrary to other areas regulated by international law, human 
rights implementation mechanisms have rarely been left in the 
hands of states alone. Politicization is understood as being synonym-
ous with inefficiency and injustice when it comes to assessing the 
work of human rights bodies. The actions of inter-governmental 
bodies such as the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Coun-
cil, or the Security Council are, by definition, political. Therefore, 
ever since the United Nations decided it had competence to address 
human rights violations, reversing its original position based on 
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, these organs have used numerous 
expert bodies to assist in this work.14 This practice has provided 
legitimacy to their human rights work since initial reliance on gov-
ernmental representatives alone met with fierce criticism.15 In addi-
tion, the non-reciprocal nature of human rights, the inequality 
between parties (individual versus state), and the configuration of 
human rights as legal claims protecting individuals from abuses 
of (state) power have all led to a very particular legal conception 
of human rights. As a result, the measures and mechanisms con-
sidered suitable for the implementation of human rights have fre-
quently been based on legal principles articulated by independent 
experts, reflected in the myriad of UN Charter- and treaty-based 
human rights bodies that have been created under the auspices of 
the United Nations. 
 14 On the declaration of non-competence with respect to allegations of human 
rights violations, see ECOSOC Resolution 75(V) of 5 August 1947, UN Doc E/573, 
ESCOR, 5th Sess, Suppl No 1 at 20, endorsing the decision of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights during its second session (UN Doc E/259 (1946) at para 22). 
The only entry point for petitions to UN organs, until 1967, was restricted to 
those addressed to the now inoperative Trusteeship Council and the “24 
Committee” that monitored implementation of the 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res 1654 (XVI), UN 
Doc A/RES/1654 (XVI) (27 November 1961). See, for example, Nigel Rodley, 
“Monitoring Human Rights by the UN System and Nongovernmental Organi-
zations” in Donald P Kommers and Gilburt D Loescher, eds, Human Rights and 
American Foreign Policy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) 
157 at 161-62. On the change of position of the organization, reflected in ECOSOC 
Resolution 1235 (XLII), ESCOR 42nd Sess, UN Doc E/4393 (6 June 1967) Suppl 
No 1 at 17, see Elvira Domínguez-Redondo, “Rethinking the Legal Foundations 
of Control in International Human Rights Law: The Case of Special Procedures” 
(2011) 29:3 Nethl Q HR 261.
 15 On the criticisms and legal questions raised regarding the decision of the former 
UN Commission on Human Rights to use its own members (governmental 
representatives) as mandate holders of the first “special procedures,” see Theo 
van Boven, “Fact-Finding in the Field of Human Rights” (1973) 3 Israel YB Human 
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This development does not mean that extra-legal, non-adjudica-
tory methods of work, where the aim is other than to discern whether 
or not a state has failed to honour its human rights obligations, are 
alien to UN human rights monitoring bodies. Mandate holders of 
special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council and experts 
on treaty bodies offer technical co-operation to states and use tools 
aimed at protecting potential victims of human rights violations, 
often without entering into an assessment of the legality of the 
situation.16 Treaty bodies have demonstrated the potential for achiev-
ing positive results through engaging in constructive dialogue with 
the state concerned.17 In addition, “confidential enquiries” to in-
vestigate widespread or systematic violations are foreseen in the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Article 20), the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Article 6), and the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (Article 8).18
Until recently, inter-governmental mechanisms of human rights 
implementation under UN auspices attained modest results, re-
inforcing the view that human rights monitoring was at an advantage 
in the hands of third parties, such as independent experts. The first 
example illustrating this point consisted of the establishment, in 
  Rights 93 at 97-101; Robert Miller, “United Nations Fact-Finding Missions in the 
Field of Human Rights” (1970–73) 5 Australian YB Int’l L 40 at 44, 54. See also 
“Membership of the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappear-
ances: Opinion of the Office of Legal Affairs (dated 15 September 1989),” in 
Bretram G Ramcharan, ed, The Principle of Legality in International Human Rights 
Institutions: Selected Legal Opinions (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 135.
 16 On the emphasis placed on dialogue and co-operation in the mandates of special 
procedures and the humanitarian element of their work, see Bertram Ramcharan, 
The Protection Role of UN Human Rights Special Procedures (The Hague: Brill, 2009).
 17 Michael K Addo, “Practice of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies in the Recon-
ciliation of Cultural Diversity with Universal Respect for Human Rights” (2010) 
32:3 Hum Rts Q 601.
 18 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, Can TS 1987 No 36 (in force 26 June 1987) [Convention 
against Torture]; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, UN Doc A/61/611 (2006) (in force 3 May 2008); Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2131 UNTS 83 
(in force 22 December 2000). The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights now also has this power under Article 11 of the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc A/63/435 
(2008) (in force 5 May 2013).
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1956, of a system of periodic reports to be submitted by states to the 
then UN Commission on Human Rights19 on progress achieved 
within their territories in advancing the rights enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,20 the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,21 and the Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.22 The purpose 
of periodic reports was not to criticize or evaluate the situation of 
human rights in a given country but, rather, to gather information 
and serve as a “valuable incentive to Governments’ efforts to protect 
human rights” and promote their implementation.23 The consensus 
among commentators at the time, still shared today, is that this 
mechanism did not result in any meaningful outcome24 in its twenty-
 19 See ECOSOC Resolution 624B (XXII), ESCOR 22nd Sess, UN Doc E/2929 (1 
August 1956) Suppl No 1 at 12; UN Commission on Human Rights, Annual Reports 
on Human Rights, Res I, UN Doc E/2844-3/CN/4/731 (1956). The most import-
ant reform to the reporting system was introduced by ECOSOC Resolution 1074C 
(XXXIX), ESCOR 39th Sess, UN Doc E/4117 (28 July 1965) Suppl No 1 at 23. 
See also ECOSOC Resolution 728B (XXVIII), ESCOR 28th Sess, UN Doc E/3290 
(30 July 1959) Suppl No 1 at 18; ECOSOC Declaration 1596 (L), ESCOR 50th 
Sess, UN Doc E/5044 (21 May 1971) Suppl No 1 at 20; and ECOSOC Res 1978/20, 
ESCOR 1978, UN Doc E/1978/78 (5 May 1978) Suppl No 1 at 27. See further 
Philip Alston, “Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges 
Confronting the New UN Human Rights Council” (2006) 7:1 Melbourne J Int’l 
L 185 at 207-15.
 20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp 
No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948).
 21 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res 
1514(XV), UN Doc A/RES/1514(XV) (14 December 1960).
 22 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, GA Res 
1904(XVIII), UN Doc A/RES/1904(XVIII) (20 November 1963).
 23 ECOSOC Resolution 1074C (XXXIX), supra note 19 at para 3. See also Antônio 
Cançado Trindade, “Co-Existence and Co-Ordination of Mechanisms of 
International Protection of Human Rights (at Global and Regional Levels)” 
(1987) 202:II Rec des Cours 302.
 24 See Ineke Boerefijn, The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Practice and Procedures of the Human Rights Committee (Antwerp: Intersentia-
Hart, 1999) at 9-13; Tom J Farer, “The UN and Human Rights: More Than a 
Whimper, Less Than a Roar” in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, 
United Nations, Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 95 at 123-24; Peter 
Haver, “The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities” (1982) 21:1 Colum J Transnat’l L 103 at 117-19; 
Samuel Hoare, “The UN Commission on Human Rights” in Evan Luard, ed, 
The International Protection of Human Rights (London: Thames and Hudson) 59 
at 79-87; Marc Schreiber, “La pratique récente des Nations Unies dans le
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five-year existence.25 Nevertheless, periodic reporting has been in-
corporated into all of the core international human rights treaties 
since then. Other equally flawed processes have included: (1) the 
much criticized “complaint procedures” (formerly 1503 procedure) 
whose impact is limited due to its confidentiality;26 (2) the still un-
used inter-state complaint mechanisms under some treaty-based 
bodies;27 and (3) the limited number of cases brought to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) based on human rights viola-
tions.28 In brief, past experience of human rights mechanisms de-
pendent on inter-governmental bodies for their implementation 
suggests that states have not been particularly committed to the 
enforcement of human rights in other jurisdictions.
It is therefore unsurprising that when the idea of the UPR was 
first mooted as an inter-governmental mechanism for the promo-
tion of human rights relying on inter-active dialogues inter pares, 
  domaine de la protection des droits de l’homme” (1975) 145:II Rec des Cours 
297 at 325-32; Louis B Sohn, “Human Rights: Their Implementation and 
Supervision by the United Nations” in Theodor Meron, ed, Human Rights in 
International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, volume 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984) 369 at 373.
 25 For decisions terminating the mechanism, see GA Resolution 35/209, UN Doc 
A/RES/35/209 (17 December 1980), followed by UN Commission on Human 
Rights Declaration 10 (XXXVII) (13 March 1981) and ECOSOC Declaration 
1981/151 , ESCOR 1981, UN Doc E/1981/81 (8 May 1981) Suppl No 1 at 46. See 
also Miko Lempinen and Martin Scheinin, The New Human Rights Council: The 
First Two Years (Turku: Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights, 
2007) at 14-15.
 26 See HRC Resolution 5/1, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1 (18 June 2007). See also 
Elvira Domínguez-Redondo, “La Comisión de Derechos Humanos a Debate: el 
procedimiento 1503 [“Future of the UN Commission on Human Rights: 1503 
procedure”] (2006) 2 Revista Iberoamericana de Derechos Humanos 34.
 27 The possibility of inter-state complaints is foreseen in the Convention against 
Torture, supra note 18, art 21; the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, 2220 UNTS 3 (in force 1 July 2003), art 74; 
the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 
195 (in force 4 January 1969), arts 11-13; the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 (in force 23 March 1976), arts 41-43; the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, UN Doc 
A/61/488 (2006) (in force 23 December 2010), art 32; and the Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 18, 
art 10.
 28 See Domínguez-Redondo, supra note 10 at 684-85. See also Rosalyn Higgins, 
“Human Rights in the International Court of Justice” (2007) 20:4 Leiden J Int’l 
L 745.
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many were sceptical, if not openly against it.29 Experience has chal-
lenged this reflexive attitude, however, and the initial scepticism 
has given way to grounds for belief that many governments are 
engaging seriously with the mechanism.30 Assessments regarding 
state compliance with recommendations must await the end of the 
second cycle, at which time judgments on whether recommenda-
tions agreed to in the first cycle have been implemented. Research, 
however, shows high levels of acceptance of recommendations 
made during the process,31 and there is significant data indicating 
positive on-the-ground impact of the UPR in the short term.32 Its 
capacity to provide unprecedented data highlights the rather medi-
ocre human rights performance of the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, five countries enjoying de facto immunity from 
strong action by the UN Commission and Human Rights Council 
until now.33 In addition, topics consistently overlooked under the 
international human rights mechanisms, such as minority rights34 
and sexual orientation rights,35 are finding accommodation under 
the UPR.36
There are other positive outcomes. Peer review mechanisms for 
the implementation of human rights such as the UPR and the lesser 
 29 On the criticisms expressed, see Domínguez-Redondo, supra note 10 at 
679-80.
 30 By April 2013, the only country not to have participated as a state under review 
was Israel (in the fifteenth session in January 2013).
 31 McMahon, supra note 8 at 13.
 32 “Universal Periodic Review: On the Road to Implementation” (2013) at 5, online: 
<http://www.upr-info.org/IMG/pdf/2012_on_the_road_to_implementation.
pdf> [“UPR”].
 33 Rhona Smith, “To See Themselves As Others See Them”: The Five Permanent 
Members of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council’s Universal 
Periodic Review” (2013) 35:1 Hum Rts Q 1.
 34 Joshua Castellino, “No Room at the International Table: The Importance of 
Designing Effective Litmus Tests for Minority Protection at Home” (2013) 35:1 
Hum Rts Q 201.
 35 The first ever UN resolution addressing human rights violations based on sexual 
orientation was adopted in June 2011. HRC, Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity, UN HRC Res 17/19, UNGAOR, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/
Res/17/19 (2011).
 36 For an analysis of the treatment of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transsexuals 
during the first eight sessions of the UPR, see UPR, “Issue Analysis: Lesbians, 
Gays, Bisexuals, Transsexuals” (2011), online: <http://www.upr-info.org/IMG/
pdf/issue_analysis_lgbts.pdf>. Minority rights are among the top ten issues raised 
during the UPR process. See McMahon, supra note 8 at 20.
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known APRM are, perhaps ironically, relying on traditional sover-
eign state diplomacy to further human rights implementation.37 We 
argue that this trend is positive at three levels: (1) at a theoretical 
level, it reveals an evolving maturity of the human rights regime 
with a capacity to detach from exclusively legalistic approaches to 
human rights implementation; (2) at a policy level, it has generated 
evidence of measured positive outcomes of peer review mechanisms, 
suggesting a preference for more co-operative approaches to human 
rights implementation as a first and complementary step to other 
more legalistic/adversarial means of implementation; and (3) peer 
review mechanisms offer both a theoretical and pragmatic frame-
work under which to reconcile universalist and relativist approaches 
to human rights, accommodating international legal obligations 
while also formally accommodating the concept of sovereignty.
Integrating Universalism and Cultural Relativism
Proponents of universal values argue that all human beings have 
certain basic human rights such as the freedoms of religion, speech, 
association, and thought. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
is the most seminal document legitimizing this perspective, pro-
foundly and positively affecting human rights globally.38 In 1948, 
the UN General Assembly proclaimed the declaration to be a “com-
mon standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”39 This 
sense of universalism is rooted in other jurisprudential theories 
such as natural law theory — that is, belief in a higher, divinely 
ordained law and its secular counterpart, the theory of rationalism. 
 37 On the meaning of peer review in academia and within different inter-govern-
mental bodies, among others, see Tamara Lewis Arredondo, “The Universal 
Periodic Review Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council: 
Transforming the Human Rights Discourse” (PhD thesis, Maastricht University, 
2013) at 85-108 [unpublished]. On the meaning attached to the expression “peer 
review” or the finally adopted “periodic review” for the UPR, see Felice D Gaer, 
“A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System” 
(2007) 7:1 Human Rights LR109 at 112-21. On the position of regional groups 
regarding this issue, see Claire Doole and Juan Gasparini, “Enhancing Council 
Credibility,” Infosud Human Rights Tribune, (2006) online <http://www.infosud.
org/Enhancing-Council-credibility,862>.
 38 William Schabas, “Introductory Essay: The Drafting and Significance of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in William Schabas, ed, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: Travaux Préparatoires, volume 1 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013) xxi. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra 
note 20.
 39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 20.
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Some proponents have sought to justify an emerging consensus on 
the right to democratic forms of government.40 Another strand 
holds that since human rights are universal, their global observance 
leads to improvements in living standards throughout the world. 
One of the most influential proponents of this perspective is Nobel 
Prize winner Amartya Sen who has argued not only that personal 
freedom and individual rights are global in nature but also that they 
are inextricably linked to economic development.41 The internation-
alization of human rights — that is, the treatment of human rights 
as a subject of international law and politics,42 reinforces its foun-
dational claim of universality. This claim is closely linked to liberal 
and constitutional conceptions of international law, based on shared 
global values.
The purported universality of some of these foundational values 
of international law has been the cause of unease and contestation 
among international lawyers.43 Third World approaches to inter-
national law have also pointed out that the universality of inter-
national law is a sub-product of colonialism.44 Similarly, the 
universality of human rights is an issue that has been hotly contested 
for decades by cultural relativists. They argue either that (1) such 
rights do not exist or (2) to the extent that such rights exist, they 
must be fully mediated and interpreted through the particular so-
cial, cultural, and historical prisms of the societies in which people 
live. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was challenged at 
its birth by the American Anthropological Association, which quer-
ied how the declaration could “be applicable to all human beings, 
and not be a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the 
values prevalent in countries of Western Europe and America.”45 
 40 Thomas Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” (1992) 86:1 
AJIL 46.
 41 Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).
 42 See Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 
at 13-29.
 43 See Jean d’Aspremont, “The Foundations of the International Legal Order” 
(2007) 18 Finnish YB Int’l L 219 at 219. See also Jean d’Aspremont, “Re-inforcing 
the (Neo-) Hobbesian Representations of International Law” (2010) 13 J Int’l 
Relations & Development 85.
 44 Antony Anghie and BS Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law 
and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2:1 Chinese J Int’l L 77.
 45 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting 
and Intent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) at ix.
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Proponents of these views have spoken against a broad-based inter-
pretation of human rights — for example, through the “Asian 
values” argument.46 Some leading developing world figures, such 
as Singapore’s former Chief Minister Lee Kuan Yew, have strongly 
contested universal interpretations of human rights and suggested 
instead that there are “Asian values” based on regional, rather than 
on universal, norms.47
Rhonda Calloway suggests that this critique provides an alterna-
tive to Western states’ perspectives, emphasizing state sovereignty, 
respect for hierarchy and authority, and socio-economic rights. This 
view holds that Western political culture is too individualistic, suffers 
from a crumbling civil society, and has sought to impose its values 
inappropriately in non-Western contexts. Counter-arguments sug-
gest that Asia is not homogenous and that there cannot be one 
over-arching set of values and that the Asian values argument has 
tended to be advanced by Asian governments or their supporters 
who benefit politically from doing so.48 This issue has also arisen in 
the clash of Middle Eastern or, more precisely, Islamic values and 
those of Western states. Ali Mazrui has focused on various aspects 
of this question, arguing that compatibility exists between the two 
cultures and that the West (his term) has much to learn from Islamic 
values.49 Other authors have noted that discrepancies in approach 
may have less to do with Islam than with the economic, social, and 
political distortions inherent in the Middle Eastern oil-based rentier 
contexts.50
A similar debate has taken place regarding African approaches 
to human rights and democracy. African intellectuals in the post-
independence period argued that single-party democracy was 
 46 Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, “Human Rights: A Western Construct with 
Limited Applicability” in Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, eds, Human Rights: 
Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1979) 1.
 47 Fareed Zakaria, “Culture Is Destiny: Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew” (1994) 
83 Foreign Affairs 109.
 48 See, for example, RL Callaway, “The Rhetoric of Asian Values” in RL Callaway 
and J Harrelson-Stephens, eds, Exploring International Human Rights: Essential 
Readings (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2007); Fareed Zakaria, “The 
Dustbin of History: Asian Values” (2012) Foreign Policy 1.
 49 See, for example, Ali Mazrui, “Islamic and Western Values” (1997) Foreign Affairs 
76; Ali Mazrui, Islam Between Globalization and Counterterrorism (Trenton, NJ: Africa 
World Press, 2004).
 50 Larry Diamond, Marc F Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg, eds, Islam and Democracy 
in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2003) at xii.
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possible and feasible in Africa. Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania 
and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia were ardent proponents of this 
theory, and President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda developed a “no-
party” variation on this theme. While this perspective has been 
discredited due to the abuses of human rights and economic decline 
that accompanied the suppression of political pluralism, a germ of 
truth lies in the fact that political institutions cannot be grafted 
wholesale from one context into another, as they were from Europe 
to Africa with disastrous results after colonial rule. This argument 
has been adapted and developed by Daniel Osabu-Kle, although 
his approach is stronger in critiquing the impact of Western models 
than in proposing realistic and workable models of governance that 
reflect regional realities and universal values.51
In recent years, an increasing number of commentators have 
sought common ground between the complete adherence to im-
mutable universal values, including human rights, and full cultural 
relativism in which rights can only be defined in the context of the 
particular society in question. These perspectives include the further 
articulation of the concept of a “right to culture,” in which the 
relativist regard for difference is made the subject of a universal 
right to express this different identity and examples by which uni-
versalist legal frameworks accommodate difference to reflect dif-
ferent traditions. Such thinking has been spurred on by the work 
of the United Nations itself. The landmark 1993 Vienna Declaration 
and Program of Action states that
[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-
related. The international community must treat human rights globally in 
a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. 
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it 
is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.52
Similarly, Jack Donnelly seeks to articulate what he views as the real-
ity of both universal and contextual elements in human existence 
 51 Daniel T Osabu-Kle, Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key of Development in Africa 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
 52 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 12 July 1993, UN Doc A/CONF.154/23 
at para 5.
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by developing the concept of “relative universality,” although he 
recognizes that the devil can be in the detail when one determines 
how much weight to assign to the “relative” or the “universal” as-
pects of this concept.53 Michael Goodhart argues that one way to 
move beyond the divide is for analysts to avoid conceptualizing 
rights as either universal or relative.54 Michael Brown struggles 
with this dichotomy, stating that
[c]lassical cultural relativism ... has been debated by scholars for more 
than a half-century. Today’s consensus is that, as originally conceived, 
cultural relativism has significant flaws … Yet there is much to be said 
for the clarity and conciseness of classical cultural relativism’s claim that 
cultures constitute different life-worlds, as long as they are not taken too 
literally.55
Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, whose previous work has fallen 
squarely into the cultural relativist camp, have also evolved in their 
thinking, largely because of the reality of the phenomenon of 
globalization. They take the approach of integrating cultural ele-
ments into a universal concept of human rights, as opposed to 
fundamentally questioning the universality concept itself.56
A related cleavage occurs in discussions concerning the nature 
and definition of human rights. One school of thought has focused 
on human rights as primarily civil and political in nature, as reflected 
in the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as 
Freedom House and Human Rights Watch. Hugo Bedau, for ex-
ample, has argued that, at their core, human rights are “negative” 
in nature, in the sense that they are focused on protecting the in-
dividual from abuses by the government.57 Others, such as Henry 
 53 Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights” (2007) 29:2 Hum 
Rts Q 281.
 54 Michael Goodhart, “Human Rights and Global Democracy” (2008) 22:4 Ethics 
& Int’l Affairs 395.
 55 Michael F Brown, “Cultural Relativism 2.0” (2008) 49:3 Current Anthropology 
363 at 371.
 56 Adamantia Pollis, “A New Universalism” in Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, 
eds, Human Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2000) 9.
 57 Hugo A Bedau, “Human Rights and Foreign Assistance Programs” in Peter G 
Brown and Douglas Maclean, eds, Human Rights and US Foreign Policy (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books, 1979) 29.
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Shue, have argued that human rights should be seen as “positive,” 
expanding the role of government in addressing basic human eco-
nomic, social, and cultural needs.58 This discussion has been col-
oured by regional and geopolitical considerations, as Western states 
have tended to define human rights in the former terms, while 
communist bloc countries before the fall of the Iron Curtain and 
those in the developing world (especially governments) have argued 
for the broader interpretation. Richard Claude and Burns Weston, 
among others, have built on the concept introduced by Karel Vasak 
of “first-generation” civil and political rights, “second-generation” 
economic, social, and cultural rights, and “third-generation” “soli-
darity” rights,59 which represent a further extension of the rights 
concept into the areas of global redistribution of wealth, the sharing 
of global resources, and the right to peace.60
As with the universalist and cultural relativity themes, some more 
recent observers have sought to identify bridges between “negative” 
and “positive” definitions of human rights. In a move that received 
considerable attention in the press and academia, the highly re-
spected and influential American Anthropological Association al-
tered its stance on the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1999, 
stating that its
working definition [of human rights] builds on the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenants on Civil and Pol-
itical Rights, and on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, the Conventions 
on Torture, Genocide, and Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, and other treaties which bring basic human rights within 
the parameters of international written and customary law and practice.61
 58 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) at 52.
 59 Karel Vasak, “Human Rights: A Thirty Year Struggle — The Sustained Efforts to 
Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (1977) 
UNESCO Courier 29.
 60 See Richard P Claude and Burns H Weston, eds, Human Rights in the World 
Community, 3rd edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) at 
19-20.
 61 American Anthropological Association, “Declaration on Anthropology and 
Human Rights” (June 1999), online: <http://www.aaanet.org/about/Policies/
statements/Declaration-on-Anthropology-and-Human-Rights.cfm>. See further 
Karen Engle, “From Skepticism to Embrace: Human Rights and the American 
Anthropological Association from 1947-1999” (2001) 23:3 Hum Rts Q 536.
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Leonard Rubenstein has suggested that human rights groups have 
an important role to play in promoting economic, social, and cul-
tural rights by (1) collaborating with partner organizations in the 
developing world in lobbying for systems and services that meet 
needs in a manner consistent with human rights requirements; (2) 
advocating for resources to fulfil economic, social, and cultural 
rights, especially by lobbying for funds from wealthy countries; and 
(3) monitoring compliance by states with the increasingly explicit 
obligations to protect, respect, and fulfil these rights.62 Bonny 
Ibhawoh has noted some movement on the part of Western state-
oriented human rights NGOs to include economic, social, and 
cultural rights in their agendas. He has also emphasized the role 
that indigenous human rights organizations in the developing world 
can play to help further this debate.63
These themes represent, in varying ways, attempts to find “middle 
ground,” to attenuate some of the highly polarized, partisan, and 
ideological thinking that was a feature of the Cold War, shifted onto 
a North/South axis, and that has subsequently evolved as a result 
of the “global war on terror” that followed the 11 September 2001 
attacks. Proposals to achieve a paradigm shift reconciling the ten-
sion between universalists and relativists have also included: (1) 
proposals to move from a “representation of culture as abstract and 
static to one based on the reality of culture as practice”;64 (2) the 
cross-cultural approach advocated by Abdullahi An-Na’im;65 (3) 
the “inclusive universality” promoted by Eva Brems;66 and (4) the 
 62 Leonard S Rubenstein, “How International Human Rights Organizations Can 
Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth” 
(2004) 26:4 Hum Rts Q 845.
 63 Bonny Ibhawoh, “Beyond Naming and Shaming: Methodological Imperatives 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Advocacy” (2008) African YB Int’l 
L 49.
 64 Addo, supra note 17 at 608-10, focusing in particular on the work of Ann-Belinda 
S Preis, “Human Rights As Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique” 
(1996) 18 Hum Rts Q 286.
 65 Addo, supra note 17 at 610-12, relying on the following works to sustain his argu-
ments: Abdullahi An-Na’im, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest 
for Consensus (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Abdullahi 
An-Na’im, “Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural 
Relativism” (1987) 9 Hum Rts Q 1; Abdullahi An-Na’im, “Human Rights in the 
Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives” (1990) 3 
Harv Hum Rts J 13.
 66 Addo, supra note 17 at 612-13, based on arguments developed in Eva Brems, 
“Reconciling Universality and Diversity in International Human Rights: A 
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approach based on “legal practice” articulated by Douglas 
Donoho.67 After summarizing the shortcomings of these approaches, 
Michael Addo has suggested that the working methods of UN 
human rights treaty bodies could offer a model of good practice 
for managing the tensions between universalist and cultural relativist 
schools of thought.68 We suggest that the creation of the UPR (and 
other international organization, peer review processes) also reflects 
this ambitious, albeit imperfect, compromise, which promotes a 
global conception of human rights while acknowledging the realities 
of regional and/or cultural differentiation.
Recent research suggests that there is robust evidence supporting 
the proposition that states ratify treaties because they intend to 
comply with them.69 It is therefore fair to deduce that the engage-
ment of states with international mechanisms reflects a level of com-
mitment to them, at least at the time of engagement. In the case of 
the UPR, for example, all states have engaged with the system (with 
the exception of Israel for a few months during the second cycle in 
2013).70 This record suggests, assuming these conclusions can be 
applied to other human rights commitments and mechanisms, at 
least some commitment on the part of participating states towards 
human rights implementation.71
It is not the objective of this article to refute the widespread, but 
uncorroborated, belief about the limited impact of UN Charter- 
based bodies, such as the Human Rights Council and its subsidiary 
bodies, due to their characterization as political organs.72 Contrary 
to Addo’s assertion that a legal approach is a necessary condition 
to achieving reconciliation between cultural diversity and universal 
respect for human rights,73 this article argues that it is the more 
  Theoretical and Methodological Framework and its Application in the Context 
of Islam” in Adrás Sajó, ed, Human Rights with Modesty: the Problem of Universalism 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) 213.
 67 Addo, supra note 17 at 613-14. This approach is articulated by Douglas L Donoho 
in “Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful 
Standards” (1990-91) 27 Stanford Journal of International Law 345.
 68 Addo, supra note 17 at 613-14..
 69 Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 80-111.
 70 Israel returned to the UPR a few months later, in November 2013.
 71 Simmons, supra note 69.
 72 Conversely, increasing evidence seems to point in a totally different direction. 
See Domínguez-Redondo, supra note 10; McMahon, supra note 8.
 73 Addo, supra note 17 at 602, 614-15.
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co-operative techniques used by human rights bodies in recent 
years, rather than the nature (that is, legal or political) of such 
bodies, that seems to be adding value to existing human rights imple-
mentation mechanisms. Preliminary research provides reason for 
optimism regarding the beneficial effects of peer review mechanisms 
on the enjoyment of human rights on the ground.74
Whatever the reasons behind it, the scale of engagement of states 
with the UPR is unprecedented, as is the data it is generating on 
levels of respect for global human rights as well as the evidence of 
opinio juris in relation to human rights and international humanitar-
ian law. The preparation of state reports for the UPR and the inter-
active dialogue is particularly useful as a tool to identify and blend 
different sets of social values at the universal level since it allows 
“the identification of the positions which the responsible organs of 
governments have officially adopted.”75 In addition, the existence 
of this data has facilitated innovative research measuring the impact 
of the UPR. The efficiency of other UN human rights bodies has 
only been tested in recent times, after decades of existence,76 while 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of the UPR’s impact were avail-
able less than five years after its implementation.77 This phenomenon 
is related to the quantity and quality of data generated by the UPR 
itself, which is relatively standard and comparable for all states.78 It 
is also not dependent on restricted sources for certain countries or 
rights, a bane often undermining the reliability of conclusions 
reached by researchers engaged in empirical analyses of the effect-
iveness of human rights mechanisms prior to the UPR.79
 74 See “UPR,” supra note 32; Domínguez-Redondo, supra note 10; McMahon, supra 
note 8. These include some specific examples of changes that have occurred in 
state promotion of human rights as a result of the UPR.
 75 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, 2nd edition 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 71.
 76 While similar works with different conclusions have proliferated since, the first 
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machinery was undertaken by Oona Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make 
a Difference?” (2002) 112 Yale LJ 1935.
 77 See “UPR,” supra note 32; McMahon, supra note 8.
 78 On the impact of the UPR on equal treatment of states, see Rhona Smith, 
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This is the first comprehensive source of information allowing an 
analysis of the standards used in practice when states examine hu-
man rights performance in a peer context. For instance, by analyzing 
the types of action verbs utilized in recommendations and ranking 
them on a scale from one (minimal action) to five (specific action), 
it is possible to develop a picture of the extent to which recommen-
dations are “softer” — that is, easier for states to accept — or 
“harder” — requiring more critical human rights reforms (and 
posing greater costs for states in rational choice terms).80
Evolving Perspectives on National Sovereignty  
and Human Rights
States have not only committed themselves to protecting the rights 
of all within their jurisdiction, but they have also accepted that hu-
man rights no longer fall within their exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 
When obligations erga omnes are violated,81 including gross human 
rights violations, states other than directly injured states may invoke 
international responsibility.82 In extreme scenarios, there is discus-
sion of the “right” (of humanitarian intervention)83 or even the 
responsibility to intervene (that is, R2P), if necessary, using armed 
force.84 The discourse over the R2P principle, its endorsement as a 
concept by states in 2005,85 and the United Nations-sanctioned 
interventions in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire in 201186 have been inter-
preted as a confirmation that “human rights concerns have effect-
ively become internationalized and the rights of non-interference 
 80 See McMahon, supra note 8.
 81 On the concept and its consequences in terms of responsibility, see Eric A Posner, 
“Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization and Constitutionalism in International 
Law” (2009) 165 J Institutional & Theoretical Economics 5.
 82 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, 
UNGAOR, 53d Sess, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001) at 318.
 83 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of 
Force in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
 84 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and 
For All (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009); Anne Orford, 
International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).
 85 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1, UNGAOR, 60th Sess, UN Doc A/
Res/60/1 (2005) at paras 139-45.
 86 See UNSC Resolution 1973, 6498th Mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1973 (2011) and UNSC 
Resolution 1975, 6508th Mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1975 (2011).
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and non-use of force have been qualified as a result ... [T]hose states 
advocating an absolute right to non-interference clearly represent 
a minority.”87
Louis Henkin was one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the 
argument that state sovereignty becomes subsidiary when this foun-
dational principle of international law clashes with the promotion 
and protection of human rights. He viewed human rights law as a 
real “revolution” of international law, changing its content, sources, 
and means of implementation.88 The erosion of the principle of 
sovereignty has been welcomed as a positive effect of the human 
rights regime at the international level. Sovereignty and human 
rights have traditionally been seen as being in an antagonistic rela-
tionship — Article 2(7) of the UN Charter has often been used by 
states as a shelter from scrutiny in relation to human rights.89
Others suggest that human rights have re-conceptualized sover-
eignty rather than eroded it. Anne Peters, for instance, argues that 
the impact of human rights in international law may culminate in 
a wholesale redefinition of the legal status of state sovereignty 
through which the antinomy between human rights and sovereignty 
will be eliminated.90 Human rights would be more than limitations 
on state sovereignty. Rather, sovereignty would find its source and 
purpose (telos) “in humanity understood as the principle that the 
state must protect human rights, interests, needs and security.”91 As 
a result, Peters claims that “sovereignty has already been relegated 
to the status of a second-order norm which is derived and geared 
 87 Theresa Reinold, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect (New York: Routledge, 
2013) at 153.
 88 Louis Henkin, “Human Rights and State ‘Sovereignty’” (1995-96) 25 Ga J Int & 
Comp L 31; see also Louis Henkin, “That ‘S’ Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, 
and Human Rights, et cetera” (1999-2000) 68:1 Fordham L Rev 1. Other com-
mentators arguing in a similar direction include Michael W Reisman, “Sovereignty 
and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” (1999) 84:4 AJIL 866; 
Felix Ermacora, “Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction (Article 2, Paragraph 
7 of the Charter)” (1968) 124:II Rec des Cours 371; Rosalyn Higgins, The 
Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 118-30.
 89 On the use of Article 2(7) by states before the UN General Assembly and the 
former Commission on Human Rights between 1975 and 1991, see Menno T 
Kamminga, Inter-State Accountability for Violations of Human Rights (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) at 88-111.
 90 Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty” (2009) 20:3 EJIL 513 at 
543.
 91 Ibid.
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towards the protection of basic human rights, needs, interest, and 
security.”92 
Similarly, Karel Wellens sees a demonstration of the “irreversible 
humanisation of international law” in the growing recognition of 
the responsibility to protect concept.93 The R2P principle did con-
stitute an attempt at redefining sovereignty. Francis Deng and others 
argued in 1996 that responsibility, understood as the obligation of 
the state “to preserve life-sustaining standards for its citizens,” is the 
essence of, and a necessary condition for, sovereignty.94 In Anne 
Orford’s words, “[i]n its various formulations, the responsibility to 
protect concept can be seen as an attempt to redefine and delimit 
domestic and international jurisdiction, and to reassert the primacy 
of the UN in the face of proliferating functionalist claimants to 
international authority.”95
The acceptance of monitoring mechanisms and peer-to-peer ac-
countability — understood as mandating, reporting, surveillance, 
monitoring, and dispute settlement — has intensified significantly 
in the last century in many areas regulated by international law.96 
The real innovation brought by human rights was not that states 
should be accountable for their legal commitments towards other 
states. Rather it was that the human rights regime, preoccupied with 
the rights of individuals within a state’s jurisdiction, “could be 
brought under this broader accountability trend in public inter-
national law.”97 Through their own consent, states have gradually 
allowed and increased the role and standing of individuals in inter-
national law and generated space for legal challenges of human 
rights violations before domestic and international bodies.
Nonetheless, a new concept of sovereignty dependent on human 
rights compliance remains at odds with the legal and political real-
ities of contemporary international law.98 The fact that human rights 
 92 Ibid at 544.
 93 Karel Wellens, “Revisiting Solidarity as a (Re-)Emerging Constitutional Principle: 
Some Further Reflections” in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima, eds, Solidarity: 
A Structural Principle of International Law (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010) 3 at 10.
 94 Francis M Deng et al, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1996) at xvii; on the gradual erosion of 
sovereignty, see also 6-10.
 95 Orford, supra note 84 at 178.
 96 Simmons, supra note 69 at 27-31.
 97 Ibid at 27.
 98 For commentary on the conceptual flaws and political limits of Anne Peters’ 
proposal, see Emily Kidd White et al, “Humanity as the A (Alpha) and (Omega) 
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— and humanitarian — arguments are increasingly used to justify 
governmental action beyond borders is often mistaken for a real 
shift away from the centrality of sovereignty in international law and 
relations. This can be illustrated through the universal acceptance 
of the principle of R2P and the UN’s commitment to its “imple-
mentation.”99 In its final version, the concept is firmly located within 
the powers of the UN Security Council, the structure of which is, 
of course, rooted in sovereign authority. It therefore falls to a col-
lection of nation-states to authorize (collective) humanitarian 
interventions, including through the use of force. This power, as is 
well known, does not find its legal foundations in the UN Charter 
but, rather, in customary law or a functional approach to the com-
petence of organs of international organizations.100 In addition, 
the modern endorsement of R2P does not create new legal obliga-
tions on the part of states to prevent or to respond to genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.101 Rather, 
the power of the concept relies on the fact that “it develops an 
ambitious conceptual framework aimed at systematising and giving 
formal expression to the protective authority exercised by inter-
national actors in the decolonised world since 1960.”102
The R2P concept remains hotly contested, as evidenced by the 
allegations of misuse of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in 
2011, which authorized the establishment of a “no-fly zone” over 
Libya, provoking an ongoing controversy.103 It is also critiqued for 
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being only selectively applied, as in the failure of the Security 
Council to invoke it in the case of the Syrian civil war.104 The ICJ 
may have repeatedly recognized, in principle, the existence of 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole (that 
is, erga omnes obligations). However, its reasoning in the Legal Con-
sequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa),105 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
Limited (Belgium v Spain),106 Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v 
Australia),107 and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America)108 reveals that it has 
not enforced the legal consequences of such a recognition. Instead, 
the ICJ has refused claims by parties that have a specific legal inter-
est in a dispute but are not directly affected.109 Likewise, an empirical 
assessment of the real influence of human rights litigation concludes 
that claims about the impact of human rights on sovereignty are 
exaggerated.110 After engaging in a thorough analysis to test whether 
facts support the narrative about the transformation of sovereignty, 
focusing on the extreme scenarios of military intervention, Theresa 
Reinold concludes: “Overall, the case studies dictate the sobering 
conclusion that we have not (yet) moved beyond Westphalia, and 
that sovereignty as responsibility continues to be a moral aspiration 
more than anything else.”111
Alongside those who disagree that sovereignty has been “eroded,”112 
those who acknowledge that sovereignty does wield less power than 
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in the past do not always view this development as being positive. 
Attenuating sovereignty does not ipso facto lead to greater capacity 
for the international community to modify states’ behaviour towards 
compliance with internationally accepted human rights standards. 
The activities of international financial institutions and non-state 
actors that led to the post-2007 global economic crisis, for example, 
have negatively affected the enjoyment of human rights. These 
developments, alongside unregulated globalization, have reified 
the need to reclaim, rather than cede, sovereignty for better rights 
protection.113 Citizens expect to be protected by their politicians, 
but “States have been shedding power to globalisation.”114 In the 
words of Martti Koskenniemi,
[w]hen questions of economic distribution, environmental protection, 
security, or human rights are conceived of as essentially global, best dealt 
with by the best forms of functional expertise available globally, then no 
room is left for communities to decide on their preferences.115
This notion invokes “the paradox of national power and inter-
national solidarity,” whereby in order to project and implement a 
sense of international solidarity, national power is needed.116 
In reference to international investment regimes, which are “argu-
ably the most effective and sovereignty-intrusive of our inter-
national regimes at the global level,” José Alvarez concludes that 
we have not moved too far from the Westphalian system of nation- 
states.117 Evidence suggests that states are on a “path to sovereign 
 113 Matthew S Weinert, “Bridging the Human Rights-Sovereignty Divide: Theoretical 
Foundations of a Democratic Sovereignty” (2007) 8:2 HR Rev 5.
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L 61 at 68.
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Solidarity” in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Nicholas J Wheeler, eds, National Interest 
and International Solidarity: Particular and Universal Ethics in International Life 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008) 288 at 289. See also Simon 
Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, eds, Making States Work: 
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2005) at 1, 359.
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re-empowerment”118 and that even “Grotians” are sceptical about 
the virtues of diminished sovereignty when faced with the backlash 
against the international investment regime, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) conditionality, or the role of the UN Security Council 
as legislator.119
This tension concerning state sovereignty vis-à-vis the promotion 
and protection of human rights lies at the core of the divide between 
states favouring “co-operative” or, conversely, “confrontational” 
strategies to prompt respect for human rights.120 Beyond doctrinal 
debates and academic constructions of sovereignty that are difficult 
to translate into legal and political realities, there is a reluctance 
to accept human rights implementation mechanisms that use con-
frontational approaches towards states and that are perceived as 
violating the principle of non-intervention. This is the official posi-
tion of the so-called Like-Minded Group of states, whose members 
have publicly acknowledged that they have been co-operating on a 
concerted strategy since 1996 in order to avoid tools aimed at “forc-
ing states to co-operate” with human rights mechanisms.121
It is nonetheless difficult to accurately locate states’ positions as 
either opponents or advocates of confrontational approaches to 
human rights implementation since political motivations often lead 
to changes of position depending on national and regional inter-
ests.122 The portrayal of such differences as characteristic of a North-
South divide leads to an artificial polarization, with potentially 
long-term damaging effects for the human rights agenda.123 In fact, 
developing countries as a group no longer hold a unified, sover-
eignty-trumps-all approach to human rights. Some developing 
countries currently align themselves with positions analogous to 
those normally associated with Western states. A record of political 
alliances within the UN Human Rights Council during 2008–09 
reveals that
[t]he Asian Group, the Eastern European Group, and GRULAC [the Group 
of Latin American and Caribbean States] never spoke or voted as a group 
 118 Ibid at 32.
 119 Ibid at 34.
 120 See Domínguez-Redondo, supra note 10 at 679-80.
 121 Domínguez-Redondo, supra note 14 at 274-75. See also Alston, supra note 19 at 
204-7.
 122 See Lempinen, supra note 8.
 123 International Service for Human Rights, “Human Rights Monitor, no 64/2008” 
(2008) at 11.
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and continued to serve as “swing regions” on a range of thematic and 
country issues. Russia, China, and Cuba almost always joined the African 
Group and OIC [Organization of Islamic States] positions while Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Ukraine, Chile and Argentina generally took similar 
positions as the EU.124
The antagonism towards mechanisms that intrude on state sover-
eignty is visible even among states who led the creation of inter-
national human rights standards and monitoring mechanisms. Two 
contemporary examples of Western countries asserting sovereignty 
at variance with universal human rights values demonstrate this 
antagonism clearly. The first concerns the United States in its re-
luctance to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child 125 or the 
Con vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 126 as well as its 
unwillingness to allow unfettered access to human rights experts 
seeking to investigate the situation in Guantanamo Bay.127 The 
second concerns British posturing towards human rights treaties 
and their implementation, especially its resistance to implementing 
the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions regarding prison-
ers’ rights to vote.128 Others with a history of colonialism, including 
 124 Democracy Coalition Project, “Human Rights Council Report Card: Government 
Positions on Key Issues 2008-2009” (2009), online: <http://www.demcoalition.
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the ‘Asian bloc,’ continue to contest a conception of human 
rights that places limits on state sovereignty through the use of 
confrontational approaches.129 Asian governments have tended to 
assert the sovereignty argument from a different perspective — one 
based on the “Asian values” debate summarized earlier. Respect 
for sovereignty is claimed, not on the grounds of Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter, nor on the grounds of consent as the basis of inter-
national law, but, rather, on the grounds of culture.130
A significant number of countries tend to view the human rights 
discourse as neo-colonialist, with the potential to destroy cultural 
diversity while moving societies towards Western homogenization. 
China, Colombia, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Singapore, Syria, Vietnam, and Yemen have 
all been labelled as “culturally relativist” in relation to human rights, 
especially within the context of the UPR mechanism, despite their 
non-contestation of the principle of universality of human rights as 
such.131 A high degree of correlation exists between states identified 
as culturally relativist and those Like-Minded Group states advocat-
ing non-confrontational approaches to human rights implementa-
tion — eight of the fourteen “culturally relativist” states are members 
of the Like-Minded Group.132
 129 See, for instance, the portrayal of the post-Cold War era as a “Westphalian order” 
versus an emerging “Eastphalian” order based on what it is described as a 
“Western-inspired effort to limit sovereignty and qualify the principle of non-
interference” using international law standards such as human rights, humani-
tarian intervention, or the responsibility to protect. Sung Won Kim, Human 
Security with an Asian Face? (2010) 17:1 Ind J Global Legal Stud 83 at 85.
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Domínguez-Redondo, Minority Rights in Asia: A Comparative Legal Analysis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 11-26.
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The United States has led the trend towards the reassertion of 
sovereignty in relation to investment treaties, confirming that a 
more nuanced analysis of the North-South narrative is necessary:
Critics of “hegemonic” international law, and particularly of economic 
legal regimes such as the IMF or that governing investment, would have 
not predicted that the world’s leading capital exporter, the state that has 
the most to gain from enhancing international protections for foreign 
investors, that has done the most to dismantle the Calvo doctrine that once 
barred investors from resorting to any forum other than local courts, and 
that produced the most investor-protective BIT in existence, would be 
leading the drive in the opposite direction.133
One positive outcome of the UPR mechanism is that it provides 
evidence that while there are some significant differences in how 
the OECD and G-77 states approach the UPR (OECD states tend 
to use “harder” recommendations), more democratic states tend 
to use the UPR more actively, irrespective of region.134 This is con-
sistent with other research regarding the engagement of states with 
UN treaty bodies.135
Given the problems and uncertainties surrounding more inter-
ventionist approaches to implementing universal human rights 
norms, a voluntary and non-coercive approach such as peer review 
takes on added appeal. The UPR mechanism is, by its global ap-
proach and particular methodology, a forum and a tool that pro-
vides space for a more empirically based approach that attenuates 
North-South differences regarding human rights. Being public and 
transparent, it meets the desirable criteria not fulfilled by other 
diplomatic means of implementing international rules, thus confer-
ring some legitimacy on the mechanism. At the same time, the UPR 
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mechanism is also consonant with arguments reaffirming the im-
portance of sovereignty as a means of human rights protection.
Peer Reviews and Conflict Mitigation
The tentative, but ongoing, bridging of the universalism versus 
national sovereignty divide has important implications for multi-
lateral actions promoting universal norms of human rights protec-
tion and peaceful conduct. Beginning with the 1948 adoption by 
states of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and especially 
after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, the international community 
has developed a range of tools to promote human rights. In as-
cending interventionist order, these include: (1) international or-
ganization norm setting; (2) co-operative approaches to human 
rights monitoring and implementation, including peer review; (3) 
“naming and shaming” — that is, value-driven, country-specific 
critiques, typically not only by human rights NGOs and expert 
human rights bodies but also sometimes by governments; (4) tar-
geted sanctions; and (5) R2P’s third pillar, relating to the use of 
armed force for (collective) humanitarian intervention.
The latter two approaches represent, in essence, tough love, while 
peer review occupies the opposing bookend, reflecting a less con-
frontational and critical approach to nurturing respect for human 
rights. The more interventionist mechanisms entail greater immedi-
ate costs both for implementing states and those that are the objects 
of these interventions, while peer review entails lower costs for 
both recommending states and states being reviewed. The more 
intrusive forms of intervention are typically aimed at situations in-
volving massive human rights violations, while peer review, designed 
to be a regular part of state-to-state interactions, deals more with 
the “lesser” sins of autocratic rule and lower-level human rights 
violations. Given the costs entailed by the more interventionist 
approaches, they are best left sheathed to the maximum extent 
possible. By contrast, peer review represents a more user-friendly 
methodology with a focus on institutions and policies supporting 
human rights on a day-to-day basis, which, if properly used, can have 
a prophylactic effect, promoting human rights to reduce the number 
of instances requiring more interventionist actions.
Expanding the scope and impact of peer review creates the po-
tential to extend international human rights and democratic norms 
by mainstreaming them. As such, they can become accepted as 
normal and regular parts of international discourse. The inter-
national organization peer review mechanisms are, by definition, 
Peer Review As a Middle Ground 91
creations of the member states of the organization undertaking 
them. They have in common a tendency to be the products of a 
consensus decision-making process based on the states’ own willing-
ness to engage. This reality, in turn, means that they almost invariably 
rely more on the carrot of positive reinforcement and inducements 
rather than on the stick of punitive measures. They are not designed 
to be quick response mechanisms for crisis situations, but, instead, 
their utility lies in their preventive function in establishing con-
ditions so crises do not arise.
The UPR and APRM both emphasize follow-up actions to be taken 
as a result of the review. By their consensual and largely voluntary 
nature, peer review mechanisms are evolutionary rather than revo-
lutionary in nature, and it is true that limited follow-up enforcement 
mechanisms and deficits in political will, resources, and discipline 
can all be impediments. There can be a tendency to make overly 
rosy assessments of particular human rights or governance situations 
or to fail fully to address key issues. The “you scratch my back and 
I’ll scratch yours” syndrome can act as a disincentive for states to 
engage energetically in peer review.
Peer review does, however, demonstrate a willingness of states to 
submit themselves to the examination, judgment, and recommen-
dations of other states on how to improve human rights and/or 
governance performance, if the perceived costs of doing so are 
manageable. And the costs of not doing so are now rising, except 
for the small minority of incorrigible states that care little about 
international attitudes and actions. There is evidence that even 
states that are more resistant to external criticism may respond bet-
ter to implementation mechanisms relying on co-operative, rather 
than confrontational, approaches.136 Should the UPR and other peer 
review mechanisms succeed in fulfilling their promise, they could 
reduce the need for more interventionist approaches by deterring 
future human rights abuses, which, in turn, would reduce the pres-
sure and expectations of robust R2P third-pillar interventions.
Few analysts have yet made a systematic and comprehensive con-
nection between how peer review does, or can, contribute to pre-
venting conflict. Preliminary evidence exists, however, suggesting 
possible grounds for linking peer review and conflict prevention. 
Indeed, the latter issue is addressed in some peer reviews. For ex-
ample, a UPR recommendation from Australia to Equatorial Guinea 
 136 Anna Spain, “Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International 
Dispute Resolution” (2010) 32:1 U Pennsylvania J Int’l L 1.
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has called for this country to “[c]ease all forms of forced displace-
ment, in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement of 1998.”137 Similarly, a Canadian recommendation 
to Sudan, which was accepted by Khartoum, stated that it should 
“end attacks against civilians and ... ensure unimpeded humanitar-
ian access to the camps of internally displaced persons in Darfur.”138 
A relevant APRM example is a recommendation to Kenya to 
“[d]evelop and implement coherent land policy to address land 
ownership, use, tenure and administration.”139 Similarly, an objective 
in Burkina Faso’s APRM national plan of action is the “Early Warning 
Program: Conflict Prevention.”140 In addition, the APRM’s democ-
racy and good political governance theme, for example, specifically 
includes the mandate to “[p]revent and reduce intra- and inter-
country conflicts.” And the UPR human rights focus implicitly 
embraces conflict prevention, while many recommendations relate 
to causes or results of conflict.141
These mechanisms reflect a formal commitment of states to par-
ticipate in this process. Although some participating governments 
may be more motivated by the appearance of participation than 
by its reality, states increasingly find themselves bound to com-
mitments and precedents simply by engaging in the process. Such 
participation represents in effect a tool for enmeshing states in a 
heightened acceptance of international human rights norms.
Considerable thought has been given to the ways in which the 
international community, including international organizations, 
can prevent conflict.142 There is also a modest amount of literature 
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on how peer reviews may do so.143 The Zimbabwean scholar- 
activist Webster Zambara argues that one of the greatest shifts in 
the international humanitarian order heralded by the end of the 
Cold War in 1990 has been the concept of holding state sovereignty 
accountable to international human rights standards. He suggests 
that while the concept of R2P has generally focused on humanitar-
ian intervention at a macro level, “the period since the 1990s has 
also witnessed an increase of micro-level institutions, in the form 
of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) that can advance 
R2P.”144 NHRIs also figure prominently in the UPR process.
In discussing the “enabling environment” surrounding the R2P 
concept, Dorota Gierycz has cited the existence of
[v]arious protection tools available within the UN human rights machinery, 
in particular the Human Rights Council with its new Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) system and the special procedures, and the OHCHR, with 
its extensive field presence tasked with public reporting and support to 
national protection systems and public defenders. It concludes that those 
tools could play a much stronger role in preventing and addressing atroci-
ties — through timely provision of information, early warning or thorough 
analysis of protection conditions in various countries.145
Mark Malan has drawn a link between the APRM and conflict pre-
vention, suggesting that in the African context, “in terms of long-
term conflict prevention and early warning, it is the political and 
governance component of the New Partnership for Africa 
Development (NEPAD) peer review that holds most promise.”146
 143 See, for example, Fabrizio Pagani, “Peer Review: A Tool for Cooperation and 
Change—An Analysis of the OECD Working Method” (2002) OECD Secretary 
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Conclusion: Peer Review as a Middle Ground between 
Universalism and National Sovereignty
This article has presented the traditional universalist versus cultural 
relativist human rights divide and suggests that a middle path may 
be emerging. Against this backdrop, we have outlined the toolbox 
of international efforts designed to actualize universal norms. 
Viewing this array of mechanisms as a continuum from voluntary to 
coercive measures, we argue that the more collaborative approaches 
that minimize confrontation may have, over the long term, the 
salutary effect of attenuating arguments that national sovereignty 
shields countries from implementing universal norms.
A key mechanism for navigating these challenges is that of peer 
review, whereby states agree to have their conduct scrutinized by 
their peers. This emphasis carries practical policy implications for 
international organizations and national governments alike — 
namely that support for peer review should be enhanced and that 
priority should be given to increasing its effectiveness. This preventa-
tive approach has the potential to reduce the need for more inter-
ventionist and coercive measures. It can also help to further minimize 
the civil and political versus economic, social, and cultural rights 
divide by including both sets of rights within its purview. This more 
collaborative and less confrontational approach to improving hu-
man rights observance calls to mind the adage that it is easier to 
catch bees with honey than vinegar, although some circumstances 
will undoubtedly continue to warrant the stronger dosage.
The preparation of state reports for the UPR and the inter active 
dialogue can be particularly useful as a tool to identify and blend 
different sets of social values at the universal level.147 The UPR has 
the potential to showcase existing or emerging customary law, shed-
ding light on state practice and the validity of arguments normally 
sustained by those taking either side of the universalist/relativist 
debate.148 The UPR and the APRM can be seen as manifestations 
of the internationalization of human rights and evidence that hu-
man rights compliance and domestic implementation have perme-
ated the agendas of all of the governments of the world, particularly 
when engaging in institutionalized fora as the UN Human Rights 
Council. From early international efforts to create a regime that 
would ban slavery, plant the seed of minority protection, and develop 
modern international humanitarian law to initiatives to establish a 
 147 Tomuschat, supra note 75 at 71.
 148 Domínguez-Redondo, supra note 10 at 703-5.
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means of prosecuting individuals for atrocities against humanity,149 
the introduction of peer review mechanisms reveals a maturity 
achieved by the human rights machinery within international law 
and politics. Being on the agenda of every foreign affairs ministry, 
states have started to treat human rights compliance as they would 
other topics in their international portfolio — that is, by using 
diplomatic mechanisms in addition to legal, expert-led mechanisms. 
The results so far suggest that states are more willing to engage with 
a more “political” means of dealing with international human rights 
matters. At the same time, a key characteristic of the UPR is that it 
is a public process, where the influence of civil society and other 
human rights bodies has considerable weight.
There is evidence that states are not particularly committed to 
the enforcement of human rights in other jurisdictions. This has 
been attributed to the particularities of human rights enforcement, 
which is reliant on collective action, and could be a feature held in 
common with other fields where reciprocity plays a limited role. 
Conversely, other international rules governed by the regime of 
reciprocity have been more successful in terms of compliance.150 
Karl Zemanek concludes that institutional mechanisms of imple-
mentation (namely reporting, inspection, verification, and investi-
gation systems, complaint procedures, and non-violent sanctions) 
in the fields of human rights law, environmental law, arms control, 
and disarmament law, “although they may indirectly encourage 
compliance, are not effective means for enforcing the erga omnes 
obligations deriving from these regimes.”151
If nothing else, the UPR has proven successful in engaging all 
states in its process, participating not only to defend their own hu-
man rights record but also to understand and interrogate (or sup-
port) that of every other state. This article does not suggest that 
peer review mechanisms should, by definition, replace other, more 
confrontational, legal-based approaches. Different strategies can 
be mutually supportive, and treaties play an important role in the 
promotion of human rights. Without the kind of principled guid-
ance offered in international treaties, efforts could become dissi-
pated, actors could work at cross-purposes, and the coherent 
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message of the priority of rights observance could become garbled. 
Treaties do not guarantee clarity, and there is much room to disagree 
on the proper interpretation of their content. However, in their 
absence, it would be much harder for all actors concerned to target 
the promotion of human rights, condition trade agreements in a 
coherent way, or have any yardstick to engage in a meaningful review 
of states under peer review mechanisms.152
Peer review processes are works in progress, but they possess the 
potential to enmesh states within a web of heightened respect for 
universal human rights norms, thus preventing conflict. A longer-
term perspective suggests that peer review represents a potentially 
inexorable dynamic. The slow-grinding operation of national and 
international bureaucracies has a good chance, over time, of shift-
ing the debate and creating a “new normal” in terms of international 
standards of domestic political behaviour. Peer review scrutinizes 
the domestic affairs of states, blunting the traditional concept of 
sovereign independence — governments that have agreed to join 
cannot avoid review by claiming that matters in their countries are 
not open to scrutiny. And governments increasingly are coming 
under pressure from international financial institutions, other 
international organizations, fellow governments, and domestic 
public opinion to participate. Standing aloof now carries a stigma 
that governments have something to hide or are otherwise seeking 
to shield authoritarian tendencies from public view. This percep-
tion, in turn, can have deleterious effects on aid, trade, and other 
aspects of bilateral and multilateral relations. No longer are only 
serious international crimes to be made open to review. Peer review 
also serves to empower domestic voices in favour of human rights 
promotion and protection by providing tangible evidence of the 
interest of the international community in these issues and by spot-
lighting these human rights defenders, providing to some extent a 
protective shield for their activities.153
 152 Simmons, supra note 69 at 375.
 153 See, for example, the remarks of Laura Laserre, president of the Human Rights 
Council, “Closing Comments, UPR Report of Bahrain, 13th Universal Periodic 
Review,” Webcast (News and Media, United Nations Webcast, 25 May 2012), 
online: <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/05/closing-com-
ments-upr-report-of-bahrain-13th-universal-periodic-review.html>.
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Sommaire
Les mécanismes d’évaluation par les pairs, tels l’Examen Périodique 
Universel, s’appuient sur la diplomatie traditionnelle entre États 
souverains comme moyen contemporain d’assurer la mise en œuvre 
des droits de la personne. Cet article soutient qu’il s’agit d’un déve-
loppement positif pour plusieurs raisons. Tout d’abord, sur le plan 
théorique, il révèle une maturation du régime des droits de la 
personne par sa capacité de se détacher des approches exclusive-
ment juridiques pour la mise en œuvre de ces droits. Deuxièmement, 
au niveau politique, il y a suffisamment de preuves de résultats posi-
tifs attribuables aux mécanismes d’examen par les pairs pour sou-
tenir une préférence pour cette approche plus coopérative comme 
mesure préalable et complémentaire à d’autres moyens plus contro-
versés, telles des approches juridiques ou interventionnistes (par 
exemple, le troisième pilier du concept de la responsabilité de 
protéger). Enfin, les mécanismes d’examen par les pairs offrent un 
cadre théorique et pragmatique pour concilier les approches 
conceptuelles universalistes et relativistes aux droits de la personne, 
servant à satisfaire à la fois ceux qui préconisent le respect du droit 
international des droits de la personne et ceux mettant l’accent sur 
le respect de la souveraineté étatique.
Summary
Peer review mechanisms, such as the Universal Periodic Review, rely 
upon traditional sovereign state diplomacy for contemporary hu-
man rights implementation. This article argues that this is a positive 
development for several reasons. First, at a theoretical level, it reveals 
an evolving maturity of the human rights regime through its capacity 
to detach from exclusively legalistic approaches to human rights 
implementation. Second, at a policy level, there is enough evidence 
of measured positive outcomes of peer review mechanisms to sug-
gest a preference for more co-operative approaches to ensuring 
human rights compliance as a first and complementary step to other 
more controversial legal/adversarial means of implementation 
(such as the third pillar of the R2P concept). Finally, peer review 
mechanisms offer a theoretical and pragmatic framework conciliat-
ing between universalist and relativist conceptual approaches to 
human rights, accommodating and integrating views that call for 
compliance with international human rights law as well as those 
emphasizing respect for sovereignty.
